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ALBERTO ALESINA AND ELIANA LA FERRARA
This paper studies what determines group formation and the degree of
participation when the population is heterogeneous, both in terms of income and
race or ethnicity. We are especially interested in whether and how much the degree
of heterogeneity in communities influences the amount of participation in different
types of groups. Using survey data on group membership and data on U. S.
localities, we flnd that, after controlling for many individual characteristics,
participation in social activities is significantly lower in more unequal and in more
racially or ethnically fragmented localities. We also find that those individuals who
express views against racial mixing are less prone to participate in groups the
more racially heterogeneous their community is. These results are consistent with
our model of group formation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many observers, including economists, are convinced of the
importance of the complex stock of social norms, trust, and
networks of civic engagement that has been grouped under the
term "social capital."^ As forcefully argued by Putnam [1993,
1995a, 1995b], social capital may produce several positive socioeco-
nomic effects which can spur economic success.
But, what determines social capital? Figure I displays the
distribution across U. S. states of an index of social capital that
embodies information on trust, membership in groups, and voting
behavior.^ Overall, this index is highest in the North/Northwest
* We are grateful to Abhijit Banerjee, Eli Berman, Francois Bourguignon,
Edward Glaeser, Glaudia Goidin, Luigi Guiso, Lawrence Katz, Massimiliano
Marcellino, Caroline Minter Hoxby, Daniele Paserman, Robert Putnam, Andrei
Shleifer, Antonio Rangel, Howard Rosentbal, Sidney Verba, Leeat Yaariv, two
anonymous referees, and to seminar participants at Harvard University (Saguaro
Seminar, October 1998), Stanford University, Ente Einaudi, CORE Louvain, 1999
EEA Conference, and 1999 NEUDC Conference for very useful comments. We also
thank Erzo Luttmer for sharing data and Spencer Glendon for help with data
sources. Mario Centeno and Daniel Altman provided excellent research assistance.
This research is supported by a National Science Foundation grant to the National
Bureau of Economic Re.search. We are grateful to both organizations for their
support, Alesina also gratefully ackjiowledges flnancial support from the Wheater-
bead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.
1, See Coleman 11990) for an extensive discussion of the foundations of "social
capital" in social theory,
2, We constructed this index extracting the principal components from three
variables obtained from the General Social Survey: the percentage of people in the
state who belong to a group, the percentage who trust others, and the percentage
vvbo voted in the last presidential election. A detailed description of the data is
given in the empirical part of the paper. Principal components analysis has been
used to construct an index of social capital also by Putnam and Yonish [1998|. Our
index is very highly correlated with theirs.
C 2000 by the President and Feliows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
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Darker areas indicate
higher levels of social
capital
^m missing
FIGURE I
Social Capital Index
and lowest in the South/Southeast. The former regions are
characterized by a racially homogeneous population and rela-
tively low income inequality, while the latter bave the opposite
features. In particular, the top five U. S. states in our social
capital ranking are North Dakota, Utah, Minnesota, Wyoming,
and Montana. All of them are very homogeneous: they are almost
one standard deviation below the national mean for both racial
fragmentation and income inequality.
The relationship between homogeneity and social capital may
not be only a U. S. phenomenon. For instance, according to tbe
international ranking reported by Knack and Keefer [1997], tbe
five countries with highest levels of trust are Norway, Finland,
Sweden, Denmark, and Canada; the same countries rank among
the top ones for associational activity and norms of civic coopera-
tion. These countries have an ethnically homogeneous population
and very low levels of income inequality.
This paper shows that there is something systematic about
the relationship between heterogeneity of communities (in termsPARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 849
of income and race) and the level of social capital; more homoge-
neous communities have a higher level of social interactions
leading to more social capital. Even though this paper focuses on
U. S. cities, our results have more general implications. Racial
heterogeneity and income inequality vary greatly in different
countries, and, through their effect on social capital, they may
influence economic outcomes and puhlic policies.
One of the common criticisms of the notion of social capital is
that it is very hard to "measure," hence difficult to use in empirical
analysis. Rather than focusing on a hroad index of social capital,
we study a critical component of it that can he measured fairly
precisely, namely the participation in associational activities,
such as religious groups, hobhy cluhs, youth groups, sport groups,
etc. Our interest in these activities is motivated hy Putnam [1993,
1995a, 1995h] who suggests that these types of social interactions
are particularly conducive to generating the heneficial effects of
social capital. More specifically, participation in social groups may
lead to the transmission of knowledge and may increase aggregate
human capital, and the development of "trust," which improve the
functioning of markets.^ In addition, social interactions and
networks may influence individual outcomes, from criminal activi-
ties, to fertility, to the labor supply* Also, participation in groups
is known to be highly correlated with political participation, and
the latter has critical implications for policy choices.^ If the
wealthy or more educated have a disproportionate propensity to
join groups and engage in political action, then public policies may
be tilted in their favor. This may lead to vicious circles, in which
disadvantaged minorities participate less, have less "voice," and
become even more disadvantaged, leading to a variety of social
problems.''
3. On the effects of positive spillovers in the transmission of human capital,
see Romer [1986], Lucas [1988J, and Benabou [19961. On trust see La Porta et al
[19971.
4. For theoretical work on the effects of transmission of information in group
and informational cascades, see, for instance. Banerjee [19921 and Ellison and
Fudenberg 11995]. An early empirical contribution on the importance of networks
is Case and Katz [1991].
5. See Verba and Nie [1987] and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady [1995].
6. Even though participation is typically associated witb "positive" socioeco-
nomic outcomes, social networks may also transmit "negative" norms. For
example, the so-called "culture of poverty and welfare" may find its roots in social
networks propagating incentives to search for welfare rather than vifork. See, in
particular, Cutler and Glaeser [1997[ and Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan
[2000] for recent empirical work on this important question. A different theoretical
perspective on groups and social norms is given by Berman [2000}.850 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
In our model individuals prefer to interact with others who
are similar to themselves in terms of income, race, or ethnicity. If
preferences are correlated with these characteristics, then our
assumption is equivalent to saying that individuals prefer to join
groups composed of individuals with preferences similar to their
own.^ Given this setup, one may expect that diffuse preferences
for homogeneity may decrease total participation in a mixed
group if fragmentation increases. However, individuals may choose
to sort into homogeneous groups. Therefore, it is not clear a priori
under which conditions more heterogeneity in the population
would lead to more or less participation. In the theoretical part of
the paper, we investigate this issue. Our model departs from
standard cluh theory, since our groups do not require contribu-
tions, do not have congestion effects, and are based on free entry
and exit of individuals. We make these assumptions because we
want to focus on how the composition of the group affects
individual choices of participation.
Our empirical results on U. S. localities suggest that income
inequality and racial and ethnic heterogeneity reduce the propen-
sity to participate in a variety of social activities including
recreational, religious, civic, and educational groups.* Among the
various forms of heterogeneity, racial fragmentation seems to
have the strongest negative effect on participation. Furthermore,
and consistent with our model, these results are more marked for
the groups in which direct contact among members is important,
like churches and youth clubs, while heterogeneity matters less or
not at all in groups with a low degree of interaction, for instance
professional associations. Finally, our model predicts that individu-
als relatively more averse to mixing with different types should be
those more negatively influenced by heterogeneity in the commu-
nity. We successfully test this more stringent implication of the
model, by exploiting individual data on attitudes toward race
7. Theoretical results by Conley and Wooders |1996| are consistent with this
assumption. They show that when agents can be crowded (positively or negatively)
by the skills of other people in their jurisdictions, taste-homogeneous jurisdictions
are optimal- To the extent that tastes are correlated with income and race, our
assumption follows.
8. We define by "race" the census classification of black, white, Asian,
American Indian, and other. We define by ethnicity the classification by ancestry,
like Italian, Irish, etc. Throughout this paper we will use the terms "white" and
"black" instead of Caucasian and Airican-American, for the sake of brevity.PARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 851
relations. In summary, we find that social capital is lower in more
unequal and heterogeneous communities.^
Recent research has highlighted a positive bivariate correla-
tion between inequality and social capital measures at the state
level."' Our multivariate analysis, conducted with individual level
data on participation and community level measures of income
inequality, sheds light on this issue. As for race, much empirical
research has studied the effects on public policy of ethnic and
racial heterogeneity. For instance, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly
[1999,2000] show that the supply of "core" productive public goods
is lower and measures of patronage are higher in more racially
fragmented localities. Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer [1995],
Cutler and Glaeser [1997], Poterba [1996|, Luttmer [1997], and
Goldin and Katz [1999] study the role of racial conflict as a
determinant of education policies and several other characteris-
tics ofU. S. cities. Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby [1999] link racial and
ethnic fragmentation to the number of jurisdictions in the United
States.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a model
that generates predictions linking heterogeneity ofthe population
and the level of participation in social activities. Section III
describes our empirical strategy and data. Section IV highlights
some simple correlations at the state level between income
inequality, racial and ethnic fragmentation, and measures of
participation and social capital. Section V presents our economet-
ric results. The last section concludes.
II. THE MODEL
III. Setup
Consider a community populated by two types, "blacks" and
"whites," their size being S > 0 and W>0, respectively. For ease of
exposition, we shall think about "race" as what identifies the
9. To the extent that one views social capital as a public good, this result is
consistent with the findings of Alesina, Baqir. and Easterly [1999]. That paper
focuses on puhhc goods provided by means of pubhc policies land taxes) chosen by a
median voter who "decides" for tbe entire community Tbe present paper instead
focuses on a puhlic good (social capital) not generated by policies but hy the
interaction of private individuals in private groups. One may think of public
policies that increase tbe incentive to participate and create social capital, but tbis
issue is not explicitly addressed in tbis paper.
10. See Putnam's presentation at tbe Saguaro Seminar, October 1998,
Harvard University.852 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
types; below we discuss other discriminating characteristics,
especially income. The population is uniformly distributed on a
line, and both types have a uniform distrihution on the interval
[0,11.11
Each individual decides whether or not to participate in a
group. We do not allow for participation in more than one group.
There are no congestion costs and no economies of scale: thus,
group size does not influence individual utility. Members of the
group cannot exclude new members, and entry into (exit from) the
group is free and costless. The reservation utility from nonpartici-
pation is u for everybody. ^^ The utility from participating in the
group depends on the composition ofthe group and on the distance
between the individual's and the group's location. Let PB iPw) be
the proportion of blacks (whites) within the group. The utility
from participation for an individual of type 7 = W,B located at a
distance / from the group's headquarters (HQ) is
(1) Uj = ula,P_j) +vil) iorj=B,W
uJ-XO, Upi-XO,
(Al) u,,p(-)^O
(A2) uJ
where P , is the proportion of group members whose type is
different from/s type, and a is a taste indicator that varies across
individuals and captures the intensity ofan individual's aversion
to the opposite race. The functions «(•) and ;;(•) are continuously
differentiable in their arguments; uj-) and up(-) represent the
partial derivatives of «(•) with respect to a and P-j, respectively,
and V/i-} is the derivative of vi-) with respect to /. Underlying
assumption up{-) < 0 is the preference for participating in a social
activity with members of one's own type. Given our assumption
that the cross derivative of u(-) with respect to a and P-, is
(weakly) negative, an increase in the proportion of members ofthe
opposite type decreases an individual's utility more, the higher is
a. We label a the "degree of intolerance" or "aversion."Assumption
11. This assumption is obviously restrictive and does not address the pres-
ence of racial segregation in housing. The nature of our arguments remains valid
as long as B and W have the .same distribution (even if it is not uniform).
12. The reservation utility may of course be a function of individual character-
istics. While this will be important for the empirical analysis that follows, we
abstract from it in the theoretical discussion.PARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 853
A2 states that utility, when evaluated at P-j = 0, is independent of
a, and when evaluated at a = 0, is independent of P.^. In other
words, when the group is totally composed of one's own type,
intolerance does not play any role, and when an individual has
zero intolerance, the composition ofthe group does not affect her
utility. In what follows, we will assume that «(0,P_,) = 0 purely to
simplify the notation.^^
Each individual is therefore characterized by two parameters
(in addition to the type B or W): aversion and distance. We assume
that the aversion parameter a and individual location are indepen-
dently distrihuted on [0,1]. We denote the density function for a
and for the distance / with/^l-) and/"/(•), respectively, and assume
that these densities are continuously differentiable on their
support.
In summary, our model has three basic components. The first
is that people prefer to interact with memhers of their own type.
The second component is that people's utility from participation
decreases the farther they have to travel to go to group meetings,
etc. In the absence of traveling costs there is no reason why people
should form mixed groups (everyone is better off by being with his
own type, no matter how far away the group is located), nor is
there a reason why more than two groups should form (or, in
general, as many as the different types in the population), given
that there is no congestion. We require the groups to have a
minimum size in order to avoid the degenerate outcome in which
every individual forms his or her own group. Finally, our model
departs from club theory and from the local public goods literature
in that no contributions are paid by the members and utility is
derived directly from participation.
II.2. Equilibrium with One Group
We begin by assuming that the minimum size ofthe group is
greater than half of the population, so that at most one group can
form in equilibrium. We relax this assumption below.^* Consider
an individual of type> = B,W and aversion a who has the choice
between joining a group with composition P_j and distance / on the
13. Tf we reniove this assumption, the only change is that the extreme of
integration with respect to / in expression (3) below becomes v Hu - u{O,P.-j)),
whicb, anyway, is independent ofP , given assumption A2.
14. For a simpler version of this model with one group and no travel costs, see
Alesina and La Ferrara [1999].854 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OE ECONOMICS
one hand, and staying out on the other. This individual partici-
pates in the group if and only if
(2) u(a,P.-j) + uil)^u.
In what follows, we concentrate on symmetric equilibria in which
the HQ is in the middle of the group.^^
The probability that the participation constraint (2) is satis-
fied can be written as
(3) n(P_,,S) = 2 f" '"" r """'-'Ua)m) da dl,
J •/ 0 •'0
where g{-) is obtained by inverting «(•). Our assumptions imply
that the partial derivative oig{-) with respect to P j is negative
and hence that dUiP j,u)/dP-j < 0. Expression (3) states that, for
given group composition P-,, the individuals of type 7 - B,W for
whom the participation constraint holds are those who are located
no farther than v~^{u) from the group headquarters and whose
aversion parameter is no greater than^(« - v{l),P ,).
The total mass of individuals of type B and type W willing to
participate in the social activity is then, respectively,
(4) B = UiPwM) • B
(5) W = UiPsJl) • W.
DEFINITION 1. An equilibrium is a group composition {P%,Pw)
such that for both types none of the memhers wishes to leave
the group and none of the nonmembers wishes to join.
In equilibrium the proportion of individuals of type B in the
group, pR, must be equal to the ratio of the mass of the partici-
pants B to the total mass of participants B + W. The two
conditions defining the equilibrium are therefore
n(Pw,u) • B
{y,,u) • B + mPuM) • W
(7) Pw = l- PE.
15. The symmetric case is the natural reference point, both from a normative
and from a positive point of view. A utilitarian social planner would always locate
the HQ in the middle of the group, to minimize total travel costs. Alternatively, if
after the group were formed the members decided by majority vote where to locate
the HQ, they would choose the middle of the group (which is the median, given our
assumptions). We can also handle the nonsymmetric case. Details are available.PARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 855
which together give us the "fixed point" equihbrium condition
contained in the following.
PROPOSITION 1. There exists at least one equilibrium P% G [0,1]
which solves
(8)
un
Proof. The proof of this proposition hke all the other proofs is
in Appendix l.^''
In what follows, for notational convenience we will suppress
the term u from the arguments of II(-)- We will restrict our
attention to locally stable equilibria. A formal definition and a
necessary and sufficient condition for local stability are provided
in Appendix 1.
Figure II provides the intuition. The equilibrium value(s) of
Ps is (are) given by the intersection of the function in the
right-hand side of (8) with the 45° line. The right-hand side of (8)
represents the fraction of members type B in the group that is
"generated by the reactions" of both types to a given composition
(PBA ~ PB)- The intersection!s) with the identity line give(s) the
value(s) of PB at which both reactions are consistent with the
actual proportions. Our stability condition requires that the slope
ofthe above function at the point of intersection with the 45° line
be less than one.^"^
Figure II depicts various possible configurations of equilibria.
In panel (a) we have a unique interior equilibrium, i.e., the group
that forms is "mixed," with a proportion P% G (0,1) of blacks and
(1 - P'ti) of whites. This equilibrium is stable. Suppose that you
add one black member to the group, so the composition becomes
PB > ^fi- The shape ofthe curve in panel (a) suggests that this
"more favorable" composition for types B does not trigger enough
participation of new B members, nor does it induce enough W
members to exit, so the group goes back to the initial equilibrium.
In panel (d) the opposite occurs; that is, any slight increase
16. Underlying Proposition 1 is the condition, \HPw,u) • B + ]](P%,u) • W >
.5iB + W). namely that the utility and distribution functions are parameterized so
that the group that forms in equilibrium meets the minimum size requirement.
17. Notice that—given our assumptions on u(-l, (?(•), fai'\ antl //(•)—the
slope of the "reaction function" defined by the right-hand side of (8) is always
nonnegative.QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
P,
45°
(a) (b)
45°
FIGURE II
Equilibrium Configurations
(reduction) in the fraction of .6 members from P% will trigger an
inflow (outflow) ofB types and outflow (inflow) of W types, so that
the composition of the group moves to complete homogeneity with
P% = UP'w = 1). While in panel (d) either P% = OorP%=l can inPARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 857
principle he stahle equilibria^^ in panel (b) only P^ = 0 is. Finally,
panel (c) illustrates the case of multiple equilibria.'^
We are interested in two features ofthe equilibrium. The first
is how the composition ofthe group relates to the composition of
the total population; the second is wko among the heterogeneous
individuals of a given type will choose to participate and who will
stay out.
LEMMA 1. Let (PB,PW) be a unique stable equilibrium. Then B <
COROLLARY 1. UB i- W and (P%,Pw ) is a unique stable equilib-
rium, then either IP%/P%) < (B/W) < 1 or 1 < (B/W) <
ipyp%).
COROLLARY 2. Let (P%,P%/) be a unique stahle equilibrium. A
necessary condition for an individual typej = B,Wto partici-
pate is that her a falls in the interval [0,a'], and her distance
in the interval [0 J], where a' and / solve, respectively,
(9) «(a-'^*,) + i;(0) - u
(10) v{l) = u.
In particular, B <W <^a^ < a"'.
Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 show that the unbalance between
the types in the population is magnified within the group: not only
is the minority tj^je underrepresented in the social activity, but it
is less than proportionately represented compared with its weight
in the population. Thus, the social group is more homogeneous
than the whole population.
Corollary 2 can help us understand this result. In equilib-
rium, the individuals participating in a mixed group are those
who are "not too averse" to the opposite race, and "not too far" from
the location ofthe group. Corollary 2 tells us exactly "how far" we
can go in these two dimensions. The maximum geographical
distance compatible with the participation constraint is such that
18. As a matter of fact, given our assumptions that B < W and that the
minimum size of the group is greater than V-i, only P'% = 1 can be a stahle
equilibrium. As we will see, this will no longer be the case in the multiple-groups
model.
19. Ofthe five equilibria depicted in tbe figure, 0, P%-i, and 1 are stable, while
Pfii and PB3 are unstable. The issue of tbe selection among multiple equilibria will
not he addressed in this paper.858 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OE ECONOMICS
an individual who receives the lowest possible disutility from
heterogeneity (i.e., an individual with a ^ 0) is indifferent be-
tween joining the group or not. Given A2, this distance is
independent of the composition of the group and of the individu-
al's type. The dimension we are most interested in is "aversion" to
the opposite type. The maximum intolerance compatible with the
participation constraint is that of the individual located exactly
where the group's headquarters are, and is given by the a^ solution
of (9). We can refer to these individuals as the "most averse"
members. Corollary 2 tells us that the most averse member of type
B will be less "tolerant" than that of type W if and only if blacks are
a minority in the population. In fact, although the two types have
the same ex ante distribution of a, we cannot observe the same
degree of "aversion" for B and W in the equilibrium composition of
the group. If we did, the same « should be indifferent between
participating as a majority or as a minority. Instead, the fact that
B is underrepresented in the population induces even some
relatively "moderate" B individuals (low u) to stay out, while W
individuals manage to keep some relatively "participation averse"
(high a) members in the group. This coupled with the sheer
unbalance in the numbers B and W produces the "magniflcation"
effect described above.
II.3. Heterogeneity and Participation
We are now ready to study how a change in the heterogeneity
of the population influences the total mass of participants.
DEFINITION 2. The degree of heterogeneity is the probability that
two randomly drawn individuals from the population belong
to different types.
This is the same definition of our empirical analysis. Obvi-
ously, in our case of two types, a 50-50 split has the maximum
level of heterogeneity. Denote by w the fraction of whites in the
population; i.e.,
(11) w = W/(W + B).
An increase in w represents a decrease in heterogeneity if «; > 1/2
and an increase ifw < V2.PARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 859
DEFINITION 3. The aggregate level of participation S is the share of
the total population who belongs to a group:
(12) S - ^^^ = n (1 - P%)a -w) + Yl (P%)w.
Under very mild sufficient conditions on IK-), described in
Appendix 1, the following holds.
PROPOSITION 2. If a unique stable equilibrium exists, an increase
(decrease) in heterogeneity reduces (increases) total participa-
tion; i.e.,
1 dS
»;<-=> —<0
2 aw
1 dS
«;>-=> — > 0.
2 dw
The intuition is simple. We can have two kinds of equilibria.
In the first one the group is homogeneous: by the minimum size
requirement this means that all the individuals of the majority
type participate, and none of the minority type does. In the second
kind of equilibrium the group is mixed, with proportion 0 < P| < 1
identified by Proposition 1. To examine the impact of heterogene-
ity, suppose that whites are the majority (w > Vii), and consider a
decrease in w leaving the size of the total population un-
changed—an increase in heterogeneity. In the first kind of equilib-
rium, all that happens is that the total number of whites is lower,
and since all W types were participating, the size of the group
decreases, and so does aggregate participation.^"^ More interesting
is the case of the "mixed" group. We have established that if B < W
then P% < Pw, and that ciPw^tlw > 0. Consider what happens to S
defined in (12) when whites are the majority and w decreases.
First of all, since U{P%) > 11(1-^1), the fall in w creates an
absolute loss in participants greater than the gain created by the
increase in (1 — w). Furthermore, the fractions of the two
20. One could devise a decrease in w such that B types become the majority.
However, as long as the probability that two randomly drawn individuals belong to
different types has increased (our definition of heterogeneity), then the total mass
of B types must be lower than the total mass of W was before the change. This
implies that the new (homogeneous) group will be smaller than before and hence
confirms our conclusion.860 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
who participate change with the new value of heterogeneity. The
sufficient condition mentioned in the text ensures that the in-
crease in the fraction of blacks is not so overwhelmingly larger
than the decrease in the fraction of whites to overcome the
first effect. Appendix 1 reports a simple example to highlight
the critical features of our results in the one-group and in
the multiple-group context, and provides an intuitive graphical
illustration.
II.4. Multiple Groups
We now set a minimum size such that at most N ^ 2 groups
can exist in equilibrium. If we denote by .S* and W"^ the mass of S
and W participants to group k, this amounts to requiring that
(A3) B^ + W^ >(B + W)/(N + 1).
The main differences with the results obtained so far arise
with respect to the possibility that multiple homogeneous groups
form; i.e., that B and W types sort into perfectly segregated
groups. For clarity of exposition, we will in turn analyze the case
of mixed and that of homogeneous groups, although it should be
clear that the same set of preferences can be consistent with some
groups being mixed and some homogeneous if multiple equilihria
forP^ exist, as depicted for example in Figure II, panel (c).
In equilibrium a member's utility from participating in a
group must exceed not only thd reservation utility li, but also the
utility that the same individual could get from joining another
group. As we wiH see, this implies that if two adjacent groups
exist, the individual located at the "border" between the two
groups must be indifferent between them. Any group will there-
fore fall into one of two categories: one in which no neighboring
group exists and the "geographic coverage" ofthe group (i.e., the
distance between the two extreme members of the group) is
maximum and is determined by a participation constraint like (2);
and one in which there is at least one adjacent group and the
border(s) of the group is (are) characterized by the indifference
condition mentioned above. Before we tum to the analysis of these
two configurations, we define our equilibrium concept in the
multiple-group context.'-^
21. In the definition ofan n-group equilibrium, we employ a slight abuse of
notation in using the intersection operator to express that two groups cannotPARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 861
DEFINITION 4. An n-group equilibrium consists of n couples
{PB\L''), k = 1,. . . ,n^N, with P|* denoting the fraction of
members type B in group k, and L* denoting the distance
between the two most distant members of group k, with
Xj'.jL' < 1 and nf^iL' = 0, such that for each (P^*^*) none of
the members wishes to leave the group and none of the
nonmembers wishes to join.
In what follows, we start by analyzing the case of multiple
mixed groups. We consider the case in which the utility function
admits a unique stable interior equilibrium, P% £ (0,1), and
investigate how the conclusions of the one-group model are
affected by the existence of multiple groups.^^ We start by
considering an equilibrium with n disjoint mixed groups.
LEMMA 2. If an equilibrium with n disjoint mixed groups exists,
all groups must be identical, and each of them is defined by
the equilibrium conditions ofthe single-group model.
The fact that the groups are disjoint implies that the mem-
bers at the "frontier" of the group are held down to their
reservation utility u. In this case the existence of other groups
does not affect the conditions characterizing the borders of the
group: the geographic coverage ofthe group is maximum and is
determined by condition (10) in Corollary 2. Furthermore, the
uniform distribution of B and W types on the line ensures that
every segment of it is characterized by the same proportion B/W in
the population. This, coupled with condition (10), implies that all
groups will be identical /i-replicas ofthe single group analyzed in
the previous section. As a consequence, the following holds.^'^
"serve" the same segment ofthe population (i.e., no individual can belong to two
groups at the same time).
22. When the utiUty function admits multiple interior equilibria in P%, the
analysis is complicated by the fact that the quantitative impacts of an increase in
heterogeneity for two groups with different P%'s will not be the same. An extensive
treatment of this case would not add much to our analysis.
23. Notice that the existence conditions for the multiple-group case are a
straightforward extension ofthe one-group model. In fact, as shown in the proof of
Proposition 1, the existence of an equilibrium proportion P% depends on the
functional forms of/J,(•),//(•), u(-), and ['(•), which are the same in ihe single- and in
the multiple-group case. We just have to modify the condition that the minimum
size is met in equilibrium with the following one: WiPwJi) • B* + II(PB,J7) • W' >
{B + W)/{N+l),k = l,. ..,«< W, where B^(H'*) is the mass of B(W) types in the
segment 2/* identified hy condition (i(/*) = u for disjoint groups, and by 21'' = 1/n
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COROLLARY 3. An increase in heterogeneity decreases participa-
tion in an equilibrium with n mixed disjoint groups under the
same conditions under which it does so in an equilibrium with
one mixed group.
The consideration of multiple groups therefore does not alter
the conclusions of the one-group model in the case in which all
groups are disjoint and each of them behaves as an isolated
community. What if the groups are "adjacent"? First of all, the
"geographic coverage" of each group can be below the maximum
identified by condition (10). Second, the members located at the
"frontier" between two groups must be indifferent between joining
one or the other. If we denote by I'' the distance of the farthest
member of group k from its HQ, this implies that for any two
neighboring groups k and k + 1 (with k = 1, . . . ,n - I), the
following holds for any member of group k with aversion pa-
rameter aJ, j = B,W, and distance /*:
(13) ^(a^P*}) + vClh = u(a-',Pl}^*) + ui?^ ').
Consider the case in which the utility function admits a
unique stable interior equilibrium, P| G (0,1), and let (P^,/*), k =
1, . . . , n be an equilibrium with n adjacent mixed groups. Then it
must be /* = /*^' for all A = I, . . . , n - 1. In other words, all
groups are identical. For this case, we still have that an increase
in heterogeneity decreases aggregate participation if it does so in
the one-group model.^^ In the example presented in Appendix 1 we
show analjd^ically why this is the case.
We now turn to the case of multiple homogeneous groups,
which yields the results most in contrast with the one-group
model. We can have multiple homogeneous groups when the
utihty function gives corner equilibria like those depicted in
Figure II, panel (d). In this case the impact of heterogeneity on
participation depends on the relationship between the minimum
size requirement and the mass ofthe minority type, as stated in
the following proposition. Without additional conditions on the
24. Intuitively, what is different here is tbat tbe border members of each
group are no longer identified hy the condition vil'') = u (indeed, the utility ofthe
border memhers with u - 0 is now strictly greater than u). This implies that the
extremes of integration with respect to I in expression (3) will he different,
although still independent of P ,. However, the impact of heterogeneity on
participation depends on how cbanges in w influence U{P*j,u), via the impact on
P*j, and this basically depends on the shape of u(). Due to tbe separability ofthe
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number of groups. Proposition 3 holds when there are an equal
numher of a\l-B and all-W groups. In Appendix 1, however, we
develop the analysis with respect to a generic number Ng of a\l-B
groups andA^wofall-lVgroups.Denote by AS/Ad ~ w)the change
in aggregate participation due to a change in the fraction of B
types in the population.
PROPOSITION 3. Let w > y^. For any stable equilibrium in disjoint
homogeneous groups,
AS _ 1
< 0 for 2t; Hu)(l - u)) < r Ad - w)
Ad-u;)^^ ^''''^'' ^"'~' "" n + 1
AS 1
= 0 for 2v Ad-u;)
The intuition underlying Proposition 3 is the following. In an
equilibrium with disjoint homogeneous groups, all individuals
within distance v~Hu) from the HQ of a group will join it,
regardless of their aversion parameter a. Starting from a situa-
tion where type W is an overwhelming majority and homogeneous
groups type B cannot meet the minimum size requirement, an
increase in heterogeneity decreases aggregate participation be-
cause it reduces the mass of the all-W groups without inducing
participationbyB.At some point, however, the increase in (1 - w)
makes the minimum size feasible for,B types, so that the decrease
in the size of existing W groups is more than compensated by the
formation of new B groups, and there is a discrete increase in
aggregate participation. Beyond this "switch" point, when equal
numbers of all-S and all-W" groups exist, any increase in heteroge-
neity leaves aggregate participation unchanged because the de-
crease in the size of W groups equals the increase in that of B
groups.
In summary, many combinations are possible depending on
the number of groups and on the adjacent versus disjoint nature of
the groups. However, the main point is that compared with
mixed-group equilibria in which the effect of heterogeneity on
participation is "smooth" and (under mild sufficient conditions)
negative, the case of multiple homogeneous groups yields a864 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OE ECONOMICS
discontinuous effect, whereby increased heterogeneity can actu-
ally increase participation.
n.5. Discussion
We have shown, thus far, that an increase in heterogeneity
can reduce participation, especially in the presence of mixed
groups. Before moving to the empirical evidence, it is worth
mentioning two points. First, the empirical literature on political
participation suggests that, after controlling for socioeconomic
status, blacks have a higher propensity to participate in groups
and to vote than whites.2^' In our empirical analysis below, we also
find the same result. The explanation ofFered by political scien-
tists is that blacks are more conscious of being a minority and
have an extra incentive to engage in political action to preserve
their identity and foster their political and civil rights. In our
model this could be accommodated by assuming that a' = aKW/B),
with / = B,W. That is, the propensity to participate is a function of
the distribution of types in the population, with ()a^/il(W/B] > 0
and Ba^/,liW/B) < 0. Therefore, ifB < W, then we must have o« >
a'^. This implies that after controlling for all other determinants
of participation, one should obtain the empirical finding that
blacks participate more, since they are a minority.
Second, thus far we have focused on differences across types
not based on income. In the empirical analysis we are also
interested in the effect of an increase in income inequality on
participation. A vast literature in local public finance addresses
the issue of group formation and income levels.^'' Our model is not
a contribution game. Differences in income matter only to the
extent that they are correlated with preferences and culture. In
this case our formalization could be reinterpreted in terms of
income rather than race; i.e., individuals would prefer to partici-
pate in social activities with people from their own income
bracket. A complication, however, is that income is a "continuous"
variable, while race is much less so: in modeling income disper-
sion as a dispersion of "types," we are therefore simplifying the
analysis.
25. See, for instance, Verba and Nie [1987|,
26. See, for instance, EppJe and Romer |1991|, Particularly related to our
analysis is the work by Fernandez and Rogerson 11996] and La Ferrara [20001,
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III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA
In the remaining part of the paper, our aim is to focus on the
link between individual aversion to different types and the
decision to join groups, and to estimate the impact of increased
heterogeneity in the community on participation. For our basic
specification, we assume that at any point in time the "latent
variable" measuring the expected utility from participation in a
group for individual i in community a can be modeled as
(14) n = X,,p + H,y + S,,5 + T\ + e,,,,
where X^^. is a vector of individual characteristics; //, is a vector of
community variables (including heterogeneity), S^, is a dummy for
the state where the individual lives, 7" is a year dummy, and €„, is
an error term normally distributed with mean 0 and variance cj^..
The vectors p, y, 6, and \ are parameters. We do not observe the
latent variable Y% but only the choice made by the individual,
which takes value 1 (participate in a group) if Y"* is positive, and 0
(not participate) otherwise.
P = 1 if y* > 0
(15) "• ^^^'c>^
P,, = 0 ifYl^O.
We estimate the Probit model (14)-( 15) using individual level data
and taking Metropolitan Sampling Areas (MSA) and Primary
Metropolitan Sampling Areas (PMSA) as "community" dimension.
We are especially interested in the vector of coefficients 7,
although many of the components of p will also be important to
gain insights into the determinants of participation.
The main source of data for our regressions is the General
Social Survey (from now on, GSS) for the years 1974-1994. This
survey interviews approximately 1500 individuals every year
from a nationally representative sample, and contains informa-
tion on a variety of sociopolitical indicators, as well as on
demographic and income characteristics of the respondents.^'' In
particular, the questionnaire includes questions regarding the
27. Note that the survey was not conducted in 1979, 1981, and 1992.
Moreover, in 1982 and 1987 black individuals were oversampled; therefore, in our
regressions we will use the weights provided by the cumulative GSS file 1972-
1994 to correct for this oversampling. The original 1972-1994 cumulative file
contains nominal income data for all years and real income up to 1993, In order to
maximize the number of observations, we bave constructed real income figures for
1994 following the same procedure that had been used for the previous years,866 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
respondents'membership in organizations such as political groups,
religious groups, unions, school associations, service groups,
fraternities, sports and hobhy cluhs, etc. We use the answers to
these questions to construct our dependent variables. The GSS
also contains information about individual attitudes toward race
relations and racial mixing. This will allow us to construct proxies
for our parameter of "participation aversion" (a) in order to test
the implications of our model.^^
Among the explanatory variables we include individual con-
trols taken from the GSS, as well as community variahles
capturing heterogeneity in race, ethnicity, and income in the place
where the individual lives. All variables are described in Appendix
2. The remainder of this section illustrates our procedure for
constructing community level variables.
It is possible to match approximately two-thirds of the
respondents from the GSS 1972-1994 with the MSA/PMSA where
they live.^^ We have used Census data to build community level
variables, adopting the MSA/PMSA as our geographic notion of
"community" Our measure of income inequality is the Gini
coefficient for the MSA/PMSA computed using family income
figures from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Censuses. The values of
Gini for the remaining years were obtained by linear interpolation
and extrapolation. Our results are not sensitive to the interpola-
tion procedure. Moreover, we computed Gini coefficients at the
state level from the Current Population Survey (CPS) every year
hetween 1974 and 1994, and the correlation between the CPS and
the Census interpolated Gini's was .65. The state level Gini's from
the CPS are those we use in Figures FV, VII, and VIII.
Our racial fragmentation index (Race) is constructed from the
Census 1990 according to the following formula:
(16) Race^ = 1 'ki'
where i represents a given MSA/PMSA and k the following races:
i) White; ii) Black; iii) American Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian; iv)
which is described in Ligon [1989]. For more detailed information about the GSS,
the reader is referred to Davis and Smith |1994].
28. In our model, traveling costs are also important. The GSS data, however,
do not allow us to know the distance hetween individuals' residence and the
location of the group's headquarters.
29. For about 40 percent of the individuals who can be matched with their
MSA/PMSA, however, the membership data are missing. This is why the number
of observations in our regressions will be smaller than the full GSS sample.PARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 867
Asian, Pacific Islander; v) other. Each term s^, is the share of race k
in the population of MSA/PMSA i. The index (16) measures the
probability that two randomly drawn individuals in area i belong
to different races. Therefore, higher values of the index represent
more racial fragmentation.^"
The ethnic fragmentation index (Ethnic) is computed by a
formula analogous to (16), using ancestry instead of race. In other
words, s^, in the formula now represents the fraction of people in
area i whose first ancestry is type k. The original ancestries
reported by the 1990 Census (35 categories) have been aggregated
into 10 different groups on the basis of common language, culture,
and geographic proximity (see Appendix 2 for a precise definition).
We have chosen to aggregate these data in order not to give the
same "weight" in the definition of Ethnic to very similar countries
of origin, say Norway and Sweden, and two very different ones,
say India and Ireland. Our results are not unduly sensitive to
reasonable changes in our aggregation rules.
Note that we use the values of Race and Ethnic in 1990 for the
whole sample. Our reasons for not interpolating are twofold. First,
we believe that racial and ethnic fragmentation within MSAs are
sensibly more stable over time than, say, income inequality.
Second, and most importantly, in order to get variation over time,
we should have resorted to the 1970 and 1980 Censuses, which
contained fewer categories. For example, all Censuses before 1990
distinguished only three races: white, black, and other. Relying on
years earlier than 1990 would thus have meant sacrificing the
precision of our heterogeneity measures to a considerahle extent.
We felt that the loss in explanatory power due to this oversimplifi-
cation outweighed the potential gain from time variation of the
above indexes. Hence we chose to adopt the 1990 measures as our
best proxies for racial and ethnic fragmentation.
Before proceeding, we need to justify our choice of MSA/
PMSA as our geographical units. To begin with, we cannot use a
smaller unit such as the PUMA because of a lack of respondent
identifiers at this level in the GSS. However, we feel comfortable
with MSA/PMSA for several reasons. First, one may argue that by
30. The Census did not identify "Hispanic" as a separate racial category.
However, Ale.sina, Baqir, and Easterly 11999|. who use the same measure of racial
fragmentation, note that the category "Hispanic" (which they obtain from a
different source) has a correlation of more than 0.9 with the category "other" in the
Census data. Thus, for all practical purposes, the category "other" in the Census is
virtually a measure of the Hispanic population.868 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
using a relatively large geographical unit one may hias our
regressions against finding an effect of fragmentation on participa-
tion. Second for several of the groups that we consider, it is
reasonahle to assume that direct interaction among group mem-
hers occurs at the MSA level (think of unions, sport groups, and
hoy scouts, for instance). Third, and most importantly, we checked
the correlation hetween our measures of fragmentation at the
MSA/PMSA and at the PUMA level. The results are comforting.
The correlation for the Gini coefficient is 0.65; the correlation for
Race is 0.75; and the one for Ethnic is 0.75.^^ Finally, we have
checked that a large proportion of the respondents in the GSS
lives in nonsegregated areas, and therefore potentially interacts
with the opposite race. It turns out that 71 percent of white
respondents say that "there are black families living close" to
them, and 48 percent of white respondents say that hlack families
live "on this block, a few doors/houses away."
IV. DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS
We begin by presenting summary statistics and a few simple
correlations among membership rates and our measures of hetero-
geneity. Summary statistics and definitions of the full set of
variables are in Appendix 2.
The top panel of Table I shows the sample characteristics of
some of our data. Participation rates are on average very high:
overall, 71 percent of the respondents are members of at least one
group, the average number of group memberships being 1.8 per
person. Also, there is considerable variation in participation rates,
both across individuals and across groups: the standard deviation
of our basic membership variable is 0.45. The fraction of partici-
pants in the various groups ranges from 0.02 for farmers' associa-
tions to 0.34 for religious groups. Sport groups are the second most
popular category, with a participation rate of 0.20, followed by
professional associations (0.17), unions (0.15), and school service
groups (0.14). Literary groups, hobby clubs, fraternities, and
service groups (Rotary, Lions, etc.) have participation rates of
0.09-0.10. Most notable is the low enrollment in political associa-
tions: only 5 percent of the respondents are members of a political
31. These correlations are weighted by the population share of each PUMA in
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TABLE I
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Panel A: Surnmary statistics
Mean Std. dev
Member of any group .71 .45
Member of cburcb group ,34 .47
Member of fraternity .09 .29
Member of service group .10 .30
Member of bobby club .10 .29
Member of sport dub .20 .40
Member of youtb group .10 .30
Member of literary group .10 .30
Member of school service group .14 .35
Member of school fraternity .05 .23
Member of veterans'group .06 .24
Member of political group .05 .21
Member of nationality group .04 .20
Member of union ,15 .36
Member of professional association .17 ,37
Member of farmers' group .02 .14
Member of other group .11 .31
Gini .41 .03
Racial fragmentation {Race) .36 .15
Ethnic fragmentation (B^/in/c) .67 .07
Panel B: Correlations
Membership Gini Race
Gini -.06**
Race -.05** .34**
Ethnic -.04** .09 .56**
^Denotes sigrificancp al thf 5 fxrcent level; *'at the I pcrtenl level.
group. Nationality groups, which we will consider in more detail
helow, are joined by about 4 percent ofthe respondents.
The last three variables in Panel A of the tahle are measures
of heterogeneity in income, race, and ethnicity in the MSAs where
the respondents live. The mean ofthe Gini coefficient is 0.41, with
a standard deviation of 0.03. Our racial fragmentation index has a
mean of 0.36 (standard deviation 0.15), while ethnic fragmenta-
tion is higher at 0.67 (standard deviation 0.07). The correlation
among these three measures of heterogeneity is quite high, as
shown in the bottom panel of Table I: Gini is correlated 0.34 with870 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Range of values
H 0-774 to 0,901
H 0,733 to 0,774
• 0,692 to 0,733
• 0,665 to 0,692
• 0,538 to 0,665
^ missing
III
Average Membership Rate, 1973-1994
Race and 0.09 with Ethnic; the correlation between Race and
Ethnie is 0.56.^^ On the other hand, the simple correlation
between average membership in the MSA and the Gini index is
not quantitatively significant; this will no longer be true when we
turn to multivariate analysis.
Figures III, IV, V, and VI illustrate the geographic distribu-
tion of our variables of interest by reporting sample averages at
the state level.
Figure III shows the distribution of participation rates from
the GSS data set, that is, the percentage of respondents in each
32. We also explored the correlation among our heterogeneity variables and
the measures of racial or income segregation of Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor [1999|.
It turns out that segregation by income is positively correlated with income
inequality, and that the various measures of racial segregation are positively
correlated with racial and ethnic fragmentation. This may suggest that segrega-
tion is "valued" relatively highly in places where heterogeneity is higher, an
observation consistent with the argument that individuals prefer contact with
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Range of values
I 0.429 (0 0.487
B 0.413 lo 0.429
• 0.406 to 0.413
• 0.396 to 0 406
D 0 377 to 0.396
FIGURE IV
Gini Coefficient, 1972-1994
state who are members of at least one group (average from 1974 to
1994). As one can see, this percentage is highest in states ofthe
north central and northwest regions, and lowest in the south and
southeast. Figures IV, V, and VI show the distrihution ofthe Gini
coefficient (average 1974-1994 from CPS data), of Racial fragmen-
tation, and of Ethnic fragmentation (hoth measured in 1990), all
calculated at the state level. These maps show a rather striking
pattern, when compared with Figure III: racial and ethnic fragmen-
tation, as well as income inequality, are highest in the southeast
and lowest in the northeast; i.e., those regions where participation
is, respectively, lowest and highest.
Similar implications can be gathered from the three panels of
Figure VII, which plot state level participation rates against the
Gini index, Race fragmentation, and Ethnic fragmentation. In all
three panels a negative correlation between membership in
groups and heterogeneity clearly emerges.872 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Range of values
• 0.409 to 0.506
B 0.313 toO.409
n 0.212 toO,313
D 0.136 toO.212
D 0.027 toO.136
FIGURE V
Racial Fragmentation, 1990
V. THE ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE
V.I. Basic Regressions
Table II displays our basic probit regression using the GSS
data set and including only individual controls. Tbe dependent
variable takes tbe value 1 if the respondent belongs to at least one
group, and 0 otherwise. Tbe regressors include a set of individual
characteristics tbat, in our model, may influence either the
individual's reservation utility if not participating, u, or the
preference for participation captured by the parameter a.'^''
33. The political science literature has generally looked at these individual
determinants of participation in isolation, i.e., correlating one or two variables at a
time with membership rates. See, for instance, Verba and Nie [1987] and Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady [1995|. A multivariate analysis with demographic controls
similar to those we include is in Glaeser and Glendon [1997], but their dependent
variable is church attendance rather than group participation.PARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 873
Range of values
• 0.692 to 0 784
B 0.662 to 0.692
n 0.624 to 0.662
n0.561to 0.624
n 0.431 to 0.561
FIGURE VI
Ethnic Fragmentation, 1990
The estimates in the first column of Table II are marginal
probit coefficients evaluated at the means; in the second column
we report heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors adjusted
for intra-MSA clustering of the residuals. First of all, the cohort
variable suggests a decline in participation hy younger cohorts.
Second, the age distribution variables show a dip in participation
for individuals in their thirties. Child-rearing activities reduce
the time available for participation: in fact, the coefficient on the
variable that captures whether the respondent has children below
the age of five is negative and significant. Note that the dummy for
age group 30-39 and that for children below age 5 are highly
correlated. More generally, both variables capture a period of
individual lifetime that is particularly "busy" because of marriage,
having children, setting up new households, etc. There is some
weak evidence that older people participate more, probably
because they have more time if they are retired, although health900709
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TABLE 11
INDIVIDUAL DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATION
Cohort
Age <30
Age 30-39
Age 50-59
Age ^60
Married
Female
Black
Educ <12yrs
Educ>16yrs
Children ^5yrs
Children 6-12
Children 13-17
In (real income)
Full-time
Part-time
STATES
YEARS
No. ab.s.
PseudoH^
Observed P
Predicted P
Marg. Probit coeff."
-.002*
-.035
-.029*
.004
.035
-.001
-.046**
.045**
-.122**
,144**
-.035**
.071**
-.005
.074**
.025**
.067**
Yes
Yes
10534
.09
.72
.74
Std. error''
(.001)
(.028)
(.018)
(.016)
(.027)
(.011)
(.011)
(.011)
(.013)
(.012)
(.014)
(.012)
(,014)
(.006)
(.011)
(.016)
*Denotes significance al the 10 psircpnt level; **at thp 5 percent ievel.
a. Marginal probit coefficientH ore calculated al the means,
b. Standard errors are corrected for helen)5keda.'iticity and clustering of the residuals at the MSA level.
considerations may work the other way. This result, together with
the cohort effect, accounts for the notion of "older civic generation"
emphasized by Putnam [1995a, 1995b].
Years of schooling are positively associated with participa-
tion: high school dropouts participate significantly less, while
college graduates significantly more. The coefficients on the
education variables remain highly significant and stable through-
out all specifications. Among the possible explanations for this
strong association, Verba and Nie [1987] suggest that more
education is generally combined with a higher evaluation of one's
own ability to infiuence sociopolitical outcomes, and with a higher
level of social interaction. In Table II we also see that women
participate significantly less than men. Our interpretation is that
they often carry the weight of a job plus a preponderant share of876 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
housebold chores and child-rearing activities: this heavy load
leaves women with less time for leisure and participation. We
checked, in fact, that women do not participate less in voting, an
act of participation which does not require a significant amount of
time. The prohahility of heing a memher of a group is increasing in
family income ofthe respondent, suggesting that participation is a
"normal good." We investigate in more detail the nonlinear effects
of income on participation in Section V.
Consider now the time spent at work. The omitted category
captures people who are not working, including homemakers,
retirees, students, and unemployed. After controlling for the level
of income, the effect of time spent at work could he twofold. On the
one hand, a constraint on time may decrease participation; on the
other hand, socialization in the workplace may increase social
interaction, incentives, and ahility to participate. Our results on
this point are consistent with basic economic principles. The
coefficient on part-time workers is larger (and significantly so)
than the one on full-time workers. This suggests that, even
though socialization in the workplace helps (in fact, full-time
workers participate more than those out ofthe lahor force), the
time constraint is hinding for people who work full time. It is less
binding for part-time workers who, on the other hand, still get the
benefits of social interactions in the workplace.^* When we control
for all these variables, marital status does not seem to affect
participation (contrary to the common notion in sociological and
political analyses based on partial correlations, which indicate
that married people participate significantly more).
For our purposes, a particularly interesting variable is "black."
As we can see from Table II, ceteris paribus, members of this
racial group participate significantly more, a result which emerges
clearly when we control for the other individual determinants of
participation but which is ohscured if we only look at partial
correlations. Note that this result is not driven by the higher
church attendance of hlacks in the south: in fact, it survives if
churches are left out ofthe definition of groups and if the south is
omitted from the regression. As discussed ahove, our model could
be extended to incorporate a feature of group consciousness, in
which the minority type participates more to preserve identity
34, This interpretation is confirmed by additional sensitivity analyses. Inter-
estingly, the unemployed participate less even after controlling for income.PARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 877
and to defend its role in the community. More importantly, since
blacks are a minority in virtually all MSAs, the percentage of
black residents is positively associated with racial fragmentation.
The result on black propensity to participate implies that if we
find that participation is lower in more racially fragmented
communities, this result is not due to the positive correlation
between percentage of blacks and racial fragmentation. On the
contrary, the fact that blacks participate more works against
finding a significant effect of heterogeneity on participation.
Regressors not shown include year dummies and state dum-
mies. The pattern of year dummies is broadly consistent with the
declining trend in participation rates, already partly captured by
the variable cohort. Many of the state dummies are statistically
significant, indicating a need to include them.
The coefficients on individual controls are very stable and
robust to different specifications.^^ Therefore, to economize on
space from now on, we will not report them, although it should be
kept in mind that they have always been included in the regres-
sions, together with the state and year dummies. We next extend
our analysis by incorporating variables that capture the character-
istics ofthe community where the respondent lives.
In Table III we include the size of the place where the
individual lives, the median income level in the MSA and its
square (all in logs), together with our measures of heterogeneity.
Size has a negative but not significant coefficient, while the
coefficients on the income variables indicate that richer communi-
ties participate more but at a decreasing rate. Finally, we move to
the characteristics of communities which are the focus of the
present paper.
The first measure of heterogeneity included in column (1) is
income inequality. The coefficient on Gini is negative and signifi-
cant at the 1 percent level, indicating that people living in more
unequal communities are less likely to join groups. Column (2)
includes our measure of racial fragmentation, which also has a
negative and significant coefficient: individuals living in more
35. We do not include home ownership among our regressors because this
would restrict our sample to 3101 obsei-vations only. When included in the
regression, home ownership has a positive and significant coefficient, consistent
with the findings of DiPasqualc and Glaeser [1999].878 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Size of place
Med HH income
Med HH inc. A2
Oini
Race
Ethnic
INDIV CONTROLS''
STATES
YEARS
No. obs.
Pseudo R'^
Observed P
Predicted P
TABLE III
HETEROdRNEITY AND PARTICIPATION
(1)
-.003
(.002)
4.379**
(1.491)
-.220**
(.071)
-.916**
(.238)
Yes
Yes
Yea
10534
.09
.72
.74
(2)
-.002
(.002)
5.733**
(1.688)
-.282**
(.080)
_ 201**
(.057)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10534
.09
.72
.74
(3)
-.003
(.002)
4.587**
(1.620)
-.227**
(.077)
-.253**
(.106)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10534
.09
.72
.74
(4)
-.002
(.002)
5.230**
(1.688)
-.259**
(.080)
-.443**
(.249)
-.141**
(.068)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10534
.09
.72
.74
(5)
-.002
(.002)
4.259**
(1.577)
-.213**
(.075)
-.773**
(.233)
-.161*
(.092)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10534
.09
.72
.74
(6)
-.002
(.002)
4.994**
(1.740)
-.248**
(.082)
-.468*
(.261)
-.112
(.071)
-.082
(.089)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10534
.09
.72
.74
"Denotes signiflcanee al the 10 porcpiit level; "at the 5 percent level.
Marginal probit coefficieiils are talculat*'(i at the means. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedaa-
ticity and clustering of the residuals at theMSAlovpl.
a. Individual controls: all those listed in Table II.
racially fragmented areas participate less. In column (3) "racial"
fragmentation is replaced by "ethnic" fragmentation as measured
through the ancestry data. Again, the negative and significant
coefficient on this variable suggests that participation is lower in
more ethnically fragmented communities.
In the last four columns of Table III we introduce in the same
regression both inequality and our measures of racial or ethnic
heterogeneity. Gini and racial fragmentation remain significant
when introduced jointly; however, the absolute values of their
coefficients fall due to the positive correlation among the two
variables, highlighted in Table I. Similar results obtain in column
(5), when we introduce inequality and ethnic fragmentation
together. Finally, both Race and Ethnic lose significance in the last
column, when they are included in the same regression with Gini.
Given the high degree of correlation between the three indexes ofPARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 879
TABLE IV
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
Member Member
Excl. influential observations'' (excl. nationality groups)
Gini
Race
Ethnic
INDrV CONTROLS'
STATES
YEARS
No. obs.
Pseudo R'^
Observed P
Predicted P
(1)
-L947**
(.742)
Yes
Yes
Yes
9935
.11
.75
.77
(2)
-.481**
(.145)
Yes
Yes
Yes
9888
.13
.75
.79
13)
-.747**
.286
Yes
Yes
Yes
9983
.12
.74
,77
(4)
-.212*-^
(.057)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10425
.09
.72
.74
15)
-.285**
(.104)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10425
.09
.72
.74
'DutiotPB .significant'e at the 10 percent level; '*iit Ihc 5 percent level.
Marginal probit coefficients are calculated at the means. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedaa-
ticity and clustering oflhe residuals at the MSA level.
a. Individual controls: all those listed in Table II.
b. Influential observations identified by predicting DFbetas for the relevant variable from the full sample
regression and then dropping those obser\'ations for which ufi.-i iDFheto) > 2/{Voh)i.
heterogeneity, in what follows, we present results from regres-
sions where the above measures are introduced one at a time.''®
V.2. Sensitivity Analysis and Causality
In Table IV we conduct a sensitivity analysis by controlling
for influential observations whose presence would sensibly bias
our estimates. We do this by calculating the DFbetas from each
original regression, and dropping those observations that lead to
major changes in the coefficients of our heterogeneity measures.^^
The results in Table IV are even stronger than those in Table
III, in the sense that the coefficients on Gini, Race, and Ethnic are
larger in absolute value. Using the estimated coefficient in column
36. When we introduced them jointly, the results we obtained were broadly
consistent; but in some instances some of the three would lose statistical
significance at standard levels of confidence.
37. Specifically, we dropped those observations for which abs(DFbeta) > 2/
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(2), we calculate that, starting from the sample mean, an increase
in Race by one standard deviation leads to a reduction in the
probahility of participation of eight percentage points. This is
quite a sizable effect, if we compare it with the impact of other
significant determinants of participation. For example, having a
child below the age of five reduces the propensity to participate by
about 3.5 percentage points: living in a community that is one
standard deviation above the mean in racial fragmentation
reduces the probability of participating by more than twice as
much. Moving from a full-time to a part-time job increases the
propensity to participate by four percentage points, that is half
the impact of an increase of one standard deviation in Race. Take
as another example, education. Ceteris paribus, going from the
status of high school dropout to high school graduate or higher
increases the probability of being a member of a group by about
thirteen percentage points. An increase of one standard deviation
in racial fragmentation has about two-thirds of this effect.
Inequality and ethnic fragmentation also have sizable coeffi-
cients. From column (1), starting at the sample mean, an increase
in Gini by one standard deviation leads to a reduction in the
probability of participation of six percentage points. This is almost
twice as much as the effect of having a small child. Compared with
the effect of education (an increase in probability of thirteen
percentage points when going from high school dropout to high
school graduate), moving from a community that is one standard
deviation above the mean for inequality to one that is one
standard deviation below, increases the probability of participa-
tion by about the same amount. Similarly for ethnic fragmenta-
tion (column (3)): an increase of one standard deviation above the
mean reduces the probability of participating in a group by six
percentage points.
Finally, it is worth noting that one of the categories included
in our dependent variable is "nationality groups." One should
expect that for this type of group racial and especially ethnic
fragmentation should not have a negative effect, but rather a
positive effect (see the next section). We ran the same regressions
of Table III excluding nationality groups. The estimated coeffi-
cients on Race and Ethnic when the dependent variable is
membership in any group other than a nationality group are
reported in columns (4) and (5) of Table IV. Compared with the
estimates of Table III (columns (2) and (3), respectively), thePARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 881
impact of racial and ethnic heterogeneity is now quantitatively
more important, as expected.^^
To explore other dimensions of heterogeneity, we have also
considered the effect of heterogeneity in the age ofthe population
living in the community. We built an age fragmentation index
similar to that used for racial and ethnic fragmentation, using a
variety of age breakdowns. None of the age fragmentation vari-
ables was significant when added to our basic specification (the
sign was generally negative as expected), while Gini, Race, and
Ethnic remained unaffected.^'^
Next we considered nonlinear effects of individual income on
participation. This is important in order to check that our results
on inequality are not a statistical artifact. In fact, if the relation-
ship between individual income and participation were concave
and we omitted nonlinear income terms from the participation
regression, moving from a more equal to a less equal distribution
of income would automatically reduce participation even if inequal-
ity per se were not a determinant of participation.'*" Appendix 4
reports our results on nonlinearities in income when we add to the
basic specification a quadratic and a cubic term in income
(possibly with a poverty dummy) together with our three mea-
sures of heterogeneity. The coefficients of Gini, as well as those of
Race and Ethnic, remain negative and highly significant. The
values of the coefficients on individual income suggest that the
relationship between participation and income is increasing and
is convex for low levels of income, and concave at high levels.
An additional test we performed was with regard to the
variable Black. As discussed above, ceteris paribus, blacks partici-
pate more. We have tested whether when racial heterogeneity
increases white participation falls more than that of blacks. When
we introduce an interaction term of black and racial fragmenta-
tion, the coefficient has the expected sign, namely positive, but it
38. Analogous results were obtained on the sample purged of influential
observations (i.e., on the sample comparable to columns (2) and (31 of Table IV).
39. Results on this point are available. The fragmentation index was con-
structed according to (16), where each term s/,, was the share of people in age
category k in MSA/PMSAi, computed from Census data. For the age categories we
experimented with different degrees of aggregation, e.g., years 0-14,15-24, 25-34,
35^9, 50-64, 65 and ahove (relatively disaggregate), as welt as 0-14, 15-34,
35—64, 65 and above {relatively aggregate).
40. This point was raised in the context of the effects of income inequality on
health outcomes, and it is addressed in Gravelle |1998|.882 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
is not statistically significant at conventional levels.*' We per-
formed a variant of this test interacting the race of the respondent
{black, white, or other, in the GSS) with the share of population in
the MSA/PMSA belonging to that race (from Census data). The
interaction term for blacks was positive and significant.^^
We next consider the issue of potential endogeneity of Gini. A
high degree of participation may reduce income inequality by
increasing availability of information, options, and opportunities.
Also, communities prone to social activities may be more favorable
to redistributive policies. These problems are much less important
for measures of ethnic or racial fragmentation: therefore, in Table
V we concentrate on instrumenting for Gini.
We consider three instruments: the number of municipal and
township governments in 1962, the percentage of fiscal revenues
from intergovernmental transfers in 1962, and the share of the
labor force employed in manufacturing. The number of govern-
ments in 1962 can safely be considered exogenous to participation
in 1974-1994, and it can have infiuenced the degree of income
inequality in the MSA. Within a metropolitan area that was
fragmented into many smaller jurisdictions, it is more likely that
significant differences in policies, local public good provision, and
income levels persist among those jurisdictions. The amount of
fiscal resources obtained from higher levels of government may
have infiuenced inequality in the MSA/PMSA. However, fiscal
transfers may target unequal MSAs, and, to the extent that
inequality is serially correlated, this instrument may be imper-
fect. The share of manufacturing is certainly not exogenous to
union participation, so when we use this instrument, we exclude
participation in unions from our dependent variable. To a lesser
extent, the share of labor force employed in manufacturing may
not be exogenous to participation in other groups as well. In
41. According to the model, the majority type (whites) should drop out
proportionally more as heterogeneity increases. The lack of significance of the
interaction term may be related to the fact that the variable black alone is highly
significant. Note that if the variable black is dropped the interaction is highly
significant and positive. Also, in evaluating the empirical test for the "magnifica-
tion effect," it shonld he kept in mind that black is not the only minority type. All
these results are available.
42, Extending the same logic to religious categories, we regressed member-
ship in church groups on the interaction terms between the respondent's denomi-
nation and the share of people belonging to that denomination in the state. Our
categories were Protestant, Catbolic, Jew, Other religion, and nonreligious
(omitted). We found positive and significant coefficients on most categories. A
similar test for religious attendance is reported by Glaeser and Glendon 11997].PARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 883
TABLE V
INSTRUMENTING GINI
Gini
INDIV CONTROLS'^
STATES
YEARS
No. obs.
R^
Hausman (p-value]
Sargan (/j-value)
Dependent variable:
OLS
(1)
- .858**
(.240)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10333
.11
Member
2SLS
Instrument set:
NGOV62
(2)
-2.130**
(.742)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10333
.10
.01
NGOV62
REVIG62
(3)
-2.252**
(.730)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10333
.10
.03
.81
Dependent variable:
Member (excl. unions)
OLS
(4)
-1.027*^
1.241)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10243
.11
2SLS
Instrument set:
NGOV62
MANSHR
(5)
" -1.730*
(.752)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10243
.11
.01
.70
"Denotes significance at the 10 percent level; '•at theTi percent level.
Marginal probit coefficionts are calculated at the means. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskcdaa-
ticity and cluHtering ofthe reaiduala at the MSA level,
a. Individual controls: all those listed in T^ble II.
summary, we are most comfortable with our first instrument
(number of governments in 1962) relative to the other two, but we
present results using various combinations ofthe three.
In column (1) of Table V we report estimates of the linear
probability model for the sake of comparison. The coefficients of
interest and goodness of fit measures from the first-stage regres-
sions are reported in Appendix 5>^ In columns (2) and (3) we
report 2SLS estimates when we instrument Gini with the number
of governments in 1962, and with the same variable plus the share
of transfers received by higher levels of governments. Gini
remains highly significant in both cases. In column (5) we use as
instruments the employment share in manufacturing together
with the number of governments in 1962. Since union participa-
tion is certainly not exogenous to the share of manufacturing, in
columns (4) and (5) we exclude unions from our membership
43. The predicted value of Gini from the regressions in Appendix 5 was
substituted in the linear probability model to obtain the estimates in Table V
(correcting the Standard errors).884 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
dependent variable. Once again, the 2SLS coefficient on Gini
remains significant and is higher in absolute value than the OLS
one (column (4)).
We should pause to analyze the fact that the coefficient on
inequality in the 2SLS regressions is larger in absolute value than
in the linear probability model. Suppose that those individuals
who are more likely to participate in social activities are also more
favorable to redistribution, thus reducing inequality. This would
imply an upward bias (in absolute value) of the estimated
coefficient on Gini in the participation regression. An alternative
argument is that individuals who are more prone to participate
are those who are less averse to mixing with individuals with a
different income level. This is in fact the basic idea of our model.
But then individuals less averse to income heterogeneity may also
be more prone to live in communities with more income heteroge-
neity. This would imply a downward bias (in absolute value) ofthe
OLS coefficient on Gini. The patterns ofthe coefficients in Table V
seem to support the second interpretation.*^
V.3. Types of Groups
The groups included in the GSS questionnaire are quite
diverse, ranging from unions to literary clubs to church groups. It
is therefore instructive to analyze participation in each of them
separately to see whether heterogeneity plays a different role in
different t3TDes of groups. This is done in Table VI.
We have run the same regressions of Table III, using as
dependent variable individual membership in a given type of
group. Each cell in the table refers to a separate regression and
shows the marginal probit coefficient on the variable listed by
column {Gini, Race, or Ethnic) for the type of group listed by
44. Finally, we have explored the efFects of our heterogeneity variables using
both a fixed-effect and a random-effect model. There are several difficulties in
pursuing this strategy. First of all, the GSS is not a panel. Second, we cannot
construct time series of our racial and ethnic fragmentation variables. Thus, we
can test within-MSA effects only for the Gini coefficient, for which we have a time
dimension (even though some interpolation is involved, as discussed above). For all
these reasons the results on within-MSA variations have tn be taken cum grnnn
salis. Our results are mixed. In the fixed effect model Gini retains a negative
coefficient, although not statistically significant (^-statistic -0.81). With random
effects the coefficient on Gini is negative (-1.17) and statistically significant
(f-statistic -5.66). The Breusch-Pagan test for random effects rejects the null
hypothesis with ap-value of .005,
45. All regressions include the individual and community controls listed in
previous tables. We have also run the group-by-group regressions using the
DFbeta method employed in Table IV. Results are very similar to those reported in
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TABLE VI
PARTICIPATION BY TYPE OF GRGI;F''
Dependent variable is
membership in
Churcb groups
Fraternities
Service groups''
Hobby clubs
Sport clubs
Youth groups*'
Literary groups''
School service groups'*
School fraternities''
Veterans' groups^
Political groups
Nationality groups
Unions*^
Professional associations''
Farmers' groups^
Other groups
Marginal Prohit coefficients on:
Cini
-1.027**
(.208)
-.323*
(.185)
-.348**
(.139)
-.520**
(.131)
-.789**
(.291)
- .430*
(.235)
-.019
(.193)
-.957**
(.433)
-.176
(.117)
-.147
(.114)
-.271**
1.128)
.033
(.090)
-.021
(.243)
.129
(.447)
2.965
(4.184)
.032
(.210)
Race
-.156**
(.044)
-.031
(.030)
-.057**
(.028)
-.078**
(.028)
-.123**
(.064)
-.060
(.043)
-.022
(.047)
-.112
(.072)
.003
(.032)
-.024
(.023)
-.028
(.024)
.018
(.017)
-.015
(.050)
.113
(.104)
.465
(.503)
-.050
(.037)
Ethnic
-.278**
(.104)
-.014
(.081)
-.103**
(.053)
.007
(.057)
-.038
(.078)
-.007
(.064)
-.025
(.070)
-.136
(.146)
-.026
(.046)
-.050
(.039)
-.023
(.048)
.077**
(.036)
.107
(.071)
.198
(.182)
.338
(.967)
-.077
(.072)
* Denotes significance at the 10 percent level. *'at the5 percent level.
Marginal probit coefficients are calculated at the means. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedas-
ticity and c I us te ring of the residuals at the MSA level.
Each cell reports the marginal prnbit coefficient on the variahle listed in the column heading from a
regression in which the dependent variable is membership in the type of group described in the row heading.
Ail regressions include the individual controls listed in Table II, .state, and year dummies.
a. The sample for each regression is restricted to those individuals vtho can potentially be members of that
particular group.
b. Sample
c. Sample
d. Sample
e. Sample
f Sample
g. Sample
h. Sample
ncludes individual.'* with at least twelve years of education.
ncludes individujiis younger than .50.
nciudes individuals with children age six to .seventeen.
ncludes cohorts 1920 to 1955.
ncludes production, clerical, sales, and service workers.
ncludes professional worker.i.
ncludes only workers whose occupation code corresponds to Agriculture. Due to the small size
ofthe sample, state and year dummies are omitted from these regressions.886 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
For each group we have excluded from the sample those respon-
dents who for one reasons or another cannot be members of a
particular group. For instance, individuals below a certain age
cannot be members of a veteran group, people who are not farmers
cannot be members of a farmers' group, retirees cannot be
members of a union, etc. The exact exclusion rules from the
regression for each group are reported at the bottom of the table
(the qualitative nature of our results is robust to the specification
of these exclusions).
What patterns are we looking for? According to the basic ideas
underlying our model, measures of heterogeneity should be less
important for groups with a relatively high degree of excludability
or a low degree of close interaction among members. The results of
Table VI are broadly supportive of these hypotheses. Church
groups are those with the strongest effect of all three types of
heterogeneity. These are groups with very little excludability and
a high degree of interaction. At the opposite extreme we have
professional associations and farmers' groups, which have a very
low level of personal interaction, although low excludability;
the coefficients on Gini, Race, and Ethnic are in fact insignifi-
cant in these regressions. Service groups, hobby clubs, sports
clubs, and youth clubs have a high degree of interaction and a
less than perfect degree of excludability. Participation in these
groups tends to be negatively influenced by heterogeneity, in
particular by inequality and racial fragmentation (the coefficients
on ethnic fragmentation are not statistically significant in every
regression).
Interestingly, and consistent with what one would expect.
Ethnic fragmentation is positively associated with member-
ship in nationality groups. This observation suggests that in
fragmented communities, individuals may feel more of a need to
preserve and actively promote their own cultural identity and
values, an observation broadly consistent with the spirit of our
model.
Finally, notice that, aside from church groups, school service
groups are the ones for which income inequality has the strongest
negative impact. This is not surprising, given that high degrees of
inequality are likely to be associated with marked heterogeneity
in preferences for the type of education and services that schools
should provide.PARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 887
V.4. Individual Preferences and Participation
Our model implies that in heterogeneous communities those
who choose not to participate should be individuals who are
relatively more averse to mixing with different types. This impli-
cation can be investigated, since the GSS asks several questions
aimed at directly identifying individual preferences and attitudes
toward racial mixing.
We modify the specification in (14) as follows:
(17) y* = X,,p + HJ^y^ + /f,/^7'^ + S,6 + rX + e,,,
where all variables are defined as in Section III, except that H^. is
racial fragmentation in the community, I^ is a dummy equal to 1 if
individual i is "averse to the opposite race" (in a way that will be
defined below), and /^ = 1 - I^. The coefficient 7^^ therefore
captures the impact of racial heterogeneity on participation for
those individuals who exphcitly declare their aversion to "mixed
interactions," while y^ captures the impact of heterogeneity for
the respondents who are indifferent or have mild preferences on
racial mixing. In Table VII we estimate this modified probit model
and test the statistical difference between the two coefficients.
Our theoretical framework implies that the coefficient on Race
should be larger in absolute value for the subsample of individuals
relatively more averse to racial mixing. A test along these lines is
especially valuable in that it captures a variation across individu-
als with varying degrees of aversion within the same MSA/PMSA—
hence it helps address potential concerns of spurious correlation
between heterogeneity and participation in the cross section.
In Table VII the dependent variable is membership in a
subset of groups for which heterogeneity is important. More
specifically, we choose all the groups for which at least one of the
three measures of heterogeneity is negative and significant at the
5 percent level in Table VI. These groups are church, hobby, sport,
youth, service, political, and school service groups.**®
The interesting thing for the measurement of individual
"aversion" is that the GSS includes many questions explicitly
concerning attitudes toward race relations. Some of them are
"yes" or "no" questions, others range on a scale of 1 to 3 or 1 to 4. In
all cases, we have created a binary variable distinguishing
46. The results of Table VII are not unduly sensitive to the choice of groups.
They are robust to focusing on a smaller or larger subset of groups.QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE VII
PARTlCrPATION ANIl AVERSION TO RACIAL MIXING
{])
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
19)
Dependent variable:
Member
Have not had opp. race home for
dinner in last few years
(NOBLKDINNER)
Would not change racist rules in
clublNORACCHNG)
Whites have right to segregated
neighborhood IRACSEGRI
Oppose your children going to
school with most opposite race
(NOMOSTSCHOOL)
Racist has right to teach
(RACTEACH)
Would oppose black president^
(NOBLKPRESIDl
Would favor a law against mixed
marriages (NOMKMARRIAGE)
Oppose busing (NOBUSING)
Think that blacks should not push'^
(BLKNOPUSH)
Probit coeff. on Race
for those who answer
Yes(7A)
-.436**
(.078)
-.266**
(.111)
-.449**
(.110)
-.325**
(.093)
-.345**
(.080)
-.455**
(.098)
-.419**
(.092)
-.273**
(.074)
- .385**
(.091)
No (7,v)
-.254**
(.076*
-.174
(.113)
-.279**
(.077)
-.230**
(.085)
_ 246**
(.078)
-.308**
(.080)
-.409**
(.076)
-.320**
(.079)
-.322**
(.090)
Test
TA = 7A'
(p-value)
.00
.04
.04
.03
.01
.01
.86
.29
.27
Fraction
ofYes
.65
.34
.09
.41
.43
.14
.20
.77
.33
*Dpnotps aignificaiicp at the 10 percent level; *•*;![ the H percent level.
MarginHl probii tiieftlcient!; taltulalpd at the means. Standard errors are corrected for heteroakedaKtitity
and clustering of the rpsidiials al the MKA level.
All regressions include the individual controls listed in Table II, state, and year dummies.
a. Sample includes nonblacks only.
"averse" from "nonaverse" people, and we have reported a rough
description of the criterion (or question) in rows (1) to (9) of Table
VTI. Details on the definition of each binary variable, as well as
the exact wording of the question in the GSS, are provided in
Appendix 2. Out of the many questions on race relations contained
in the GSS, we have chosen those for which we had a sufficiently
high number of respondents on both sides.^' Table VII reports the
marginal probit coefficients on the racial fragmentation variable
from a participation regression and a test that the two coefficients
47. In practice, this means that we have excluded several questions for which
the yes answer had only about 200 observations. For these cases, the sizes of the
coefficients on Race were consistent with our hypothesis, even though the scarcity
of obsen.'ations made the estimation unreliable.PARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 889
of interest are significantly different from each other. The last
column reports the fraction of respondents who answered "yes" to
the specific question.
The estimates in Table VII provide considerable support for
this implication of our model. For eight out of nine questions
concerning attitudes toward race relations, the effect of racial
heterogeneity is strongest for the individuals more averse to
racial mixing, namely the coefficient in the first column is larger
in absolute value than the one in the second column. In six of these
eight cases the difference in the coefficients is statistically signifi-
cant, with ap-va\ue of less than 0.05.
A particularly interesting question is the one about whether
one has had a black person home for dinner in the past few
years."^^ In fact, this is a question concerning individuals' actual
behavior, as opposed to a test of a generic attitude toward race in
an abstract sense. Therefore, it may be a better measure of
individuals' true attitude toward racial mixing and interracial
direct contacts, which is the essence of our model. In fact, recent
results by Glaeser et al. [2000] are quite supportive of this
interpretation. They find that when individuals are asked in the
abstract they claim to have a large amount of "trust" toward
others, but their behavior in actual experiments is much less
prone to trusting others. Our results based upon this behavioral
question are very strongly in favor of our hypothesis, as shown in
line (1). Also, especially interesting is question (2), which explic-
itly addresses issues of racial mixing in groups by asking people if
they would try to change the rules in a club that would not let a
member of the opposite race join. For this question as well we
obtain strong results. Question (3) addresses the right to live in
segregated neighborhoods; again we find that those who strongly
support segregation are more negatively affected by heterogene-
ity. Similar considerations apply to question (4), which concerns
mixing of children in schools.''^ We also obtain favorable results on
the question of whether racists should be allowed to teach (row
48. Until 1978 this question was asked of nonblacks only; since 1978 it was
asked of all respondents in terms of "opposite race." In Table VII we report the
results when the sample is restricted to nonblacks for all years. Analogous results
obtain if we include all races using the years from 1978 on.
49. The GSS also includes question concerning sending children to school
with "a few" children of the opposite race. Most people answered "no" making this
question hard to use. There is also a question about "half" children of the opposite
race: results on this one are similar to tho.se reported in the text for the almost
identical question.890 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
The only question for which the two coefficients have the
reverse pattern concerns "busing." However, we suspect that the
answer to this question may have more to do with an individual's
stand on mandatory busing as "reverse discrimination" versus
"affirmative action," than with the actual willingness to interact
with different races.
Unfortunately, we cannot perform a test similar to that
reported in Table VII on our two other measures of heterogeneity
The GSS does not include questions that can proxy for attitudes
toward ethnicity. As for income heterogeneity, the survey asks a
few questions on attitudes toward redistributive fiscal policy (e.g.,
whether the government should actively help the poor, or whether
the federal income is too high), but nothing that may capture
attitudes toward interactions with individuals of a different
income or social level.
An additional set of variables that we considered is the
measures of racial and income segregation constructed by Cutler,
Glaeser, and Vigdor [1999]. Our model does not deal directly with
segregation, but one may argue that in more segregated communi-
ties racial and income mixing is lower, and therefore even people
relatively averse to heterogeneity may be willing to participate in
groups.''^ If this interpretation is correct, and if heterogeneity and
segregation were positively correlated (as indeed they seem to be),
omitting segregation from our regressions would bias our results
against finding an effect of heterogeneity on participation. We
have tested the effect of segregation and found results that are
only weakly supportive of this interpretation. In particular, the
various measures of segregation do not always appear to have
significant coefficients, neither alone nor interacted with the
heterogeneity variables. A possible explanation is that several of
the groups in the GSS questionnaire are generally city based;
thus, segregation may not be sufficient to prevent mixing, particu-
larly in small cities. Also, recall that—as mentioned at the end of
Section III—the degree of housing segregation in the GSS sample
seems limited.
50. A "racist" is defined in the GSS as someone who believes that blacks are
genetically inferior to whites. The GSS also includes a question on the right of
racists to speak. The answers are extremely highly correlated with those to the
question about the right to teach.
51. In terms of the model this may imply that in more segregated communi-
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Participation in social activities is positively associated with
several valuable phenomena, like trust and human capital exter-
nalities. The propensity to participate is of course influenced to a
large extent by individual characteristics, but it also depends on
the composition and degree of heterogeneity ofthe community. In
the theoretical part of this paper, we show under which conditions
more heterogeneity in the population leads to less social interac-
tion. We then explore the evidence on U. S. cities and find that
income inequahty and racial fragmentation are strongly inversely
related to participation. Ethnic fragmentation also negatively
influences participation, but less than racial fragmentation. The
groups that are more affected by heterogeneity are those in which
members directly interact to a significant extent, and in which
excludability is low. Also, in accordance with our model, we find
that the individuals who choose to participate less in racially
mixed communities are those who most vocally oppose racial
mixing.
APPENDIX 1
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 can be proved by applying Brouwer's fixed point
theorem to the function/'(PB) defined by the right-hand side of (8).
Notice first of all that/"(P^) maps the interval [0,1] into itself, and
that [0,1] is clearly a nonempty, compact, and convex set. All we
need to show therefore is that the right-hand side of (8) is a
function, and that it is continuous. This follows from our assump-
tions that/•„(•) and/•/(•) are continuously differentiable, u(-) and v{-)
are well-behaved, and B,W > 0. D
B. Stability
We define an equilibrium (P%,1 - P%) as locally stable if for
given W and B a small perturbation, say to (P% + e,l - P| - e)
with e S 0 sufliciently small, reverts to the original iP%,l - PB).
In other words, a group is "stable" if when we add (remove) one
member of either type, so that the composition of the group
changes, this individual will choose to exit (reenter) the group.
Applying Leibnitz's rule to the function IK-) defined in (3), we get
the following necessary and sufficient condition for {Pt,l - P%)to892 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
be locally stable:
n{F*s) • arid - Pt)/<>p% - mi - p%) • dU{Pi)/iiP% w
'
C. Proof of Lemma 1
Tbe proof of Lemma 1 can be divided into two parts.
(a) B<W^P%<P%.
Apply tbe implicit function tbeorem to (8) to get
i^P%
{A.2)
% • ma - PtVdPt - n(i - p%) • aiicp^vapg w
\na - pp + u(p%)iw/BT s
Under tbe stability condition (A.l) tbis derivative is unambigu-
ously negative. Note tbat by symmetry wben B = W tbe unique
equilibrium must be P% = Vz = Pw- Condition (a) follows from
tbese two facts.
(b) P%<Pl^B<W.
By contradiction. Suppose tbat B > W. Tben by tbe same
arguments as in part (a) we sbould bave P% > Pw, wbicb
contradicts tbe bypotbesis. D
D. Proof of Corollary 1
Let us start by sbowing tbat B<W^ (PyPw) < {B/W). From
(6) we can write tbe ratio of tbe two proportions as
P% UiPl) B
Pi niP%)W'
From Lemma 1, B < W implies tbat Pw > P%- Given tbat
fflKP ,)/dP , < 0, this in turn implies that n(P^) < U(P%), which
proves tbe first part of tbe corollary. Tbe second part, namely
B > W ^ (P'pPl,) > (B/W), can be proved witb tbe same
arguments. D
E. Proof of Corollary 2
Starting from tbe participation constraint (2) and observing
tbe monotonicity of its left-band side, it is straightforward to
obtain (9) and (10)—for tbe latter, remember tbat u(0^-;) ^ 0.PARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 893
The last part of the corollary follows from the fact that a, ^
giu - (;(O),P*j), where <'lg/iiP*j < 0, coupled with Lemma 1. n
F. Proof of Proposition 2
From (12) we obtain
dS
(A.3) ^
du) U {P%) ~ U
+ a-
We need to find the conditions under which (A.3) is negative. Let
us start by showing that w < Vi implies that dSldw < 0. As proved
in Lemma 1, when w < Vi, we have P\ > P^. Given that
dUiP-j)/(iP j < 0, the expression in the first square brackets in
{A.3) is thus negative. As for the second part ofthe derivative, we
know that in a stable equilibrium <'lP%/c}w < 0, so it is sufficient
(but not necessary) to show that the expression in the second
square brackets is positive to prove our result. This amounts to
requiring that
w
(A.4) <
1-w
Notice that the left-hand side of (A.4) is less than one by
assumption.^^ Therefore, a sufficient, though not necessary, condi-
tion for the above inequality to hold is that ^'H]iP%)/r>P% > 0.
Intuitively, f.iH]iP'B)/(iP% ^ 0 says that the negative effect of
heterogeneity on participation will likely be observed when the
distribution ofthe a's is uniform or skewed to the right (i.e., when
there is a significant part ofthe population who dislikes interac-
tion with the opposite type) and when the fraction of people whose
utility exceeds the reservation level decreases relatively more at
low levels ofthe proportion ofthe opposite type in the group.^^
However, note that even when n"(-) < 0, i.e., when most individu-
als have mild preferences on racial relations, it is still possible
52. Notice also that <iU{P%)/{iP% and ^n(1 - P%}/flP^ have opposite signs. In
fact, the former denotes how the u of W types changes when PB changes (hence it is
negative), while the latter denotes how the a ofB types changes when P^ changes,
namely t)ll(P^)/r)P^>0.
53. The latter condition is much less restrictive than it looks. In fact it is
always satisfied when u and P enter multiplicatively in the utility function,
whatever the exact functional form.894 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OE ECONOMICS
that dS/dw < 0 because all other effects work in this direction.
The condition W'i-) > 0 is in fact "twice sufficient": the first time
because it is sufficient but not necessary for (A.4) to hold; the
second time because (A.4) is sufficient but not necessary for (A.3)
to be satisfied.
The second half of the proposition, namely the fact that w > 1/2
implies dS/dw > 0, can be proved along the same lines. D
G. An Example
Suppose that a. has a uniform distribution on [0,1], individu-
als are uniformly distributed on [0,1], and that the utility function
for type j = B,W is
(A.5) Uj= -a^iP7j-L
The reservation utility from nonparticipation is « G (-.2,0) for
everyone.'^'* Notice that the functional form (A.5) has :)Ujli)P-j < 0
and ri^Uj/iiP'ii > 0. A positive second derivative implies that
increasing the proportion of whites decreases the marginal utility
of blacks by more if tbere are very few whites. Suppose that a
group is completely homogeneous; the first few participants of
different types may require the adoption of different procedures, a
different language etc. These costs would be declining as the
minority becomes larger. This specification leads to a solution like
the one that is represented graphically as in panel (a) of Figure I.^'^
For a ratio W/B = 2, for instance, we have a unique stable
equilibrium in which Pw = 0.8 and P% = 0.2. The aggregate
participation rate is
1 u; w
(A.6) S
It is easy to verify that the stability condition is always satisfied in
this example and the derivative of S with respect to w is
unambiguously positive for w > 1/2; i.e., reduced heterogeneity
54. The specific interval chosen for u ensures that in our example with W/B =
2 the domain of integration for u and / is a simple triangle as depicted in Figure
VIII. Our results carry over to different parameter values: it is just a matter of
splitting the integral to have the correct extremes of integration.
55. A different example can be constructed starting from the functional form
Uj = -aiP ,)'^ - /, which has both the first and second derivatives with respect
to P j(j = B.W) negative. The interpretation would be that of groups where
majority voting matters for certain decisions, so that the marginal utility of losing
memhers of your own type may be increasing as you are approaching a half and
half split. This example generates homogeneous groups in equilibrium; i.e., P%= 1
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increases participation. Figure VIII can help understand why this
is the case.
On the horizontal axis we measure individual location, and on
the vertical axis individual aversion. The members from the two
t3T^es who participate in the group can be represented by "tri-
angles." In fact, the frontier of (a,/) combinations satisfjdng the
participation constraint is
(A.7) a<{-u -
The basis of the triangles in Figure VIII is 2/ ^ -2u and is the
same for both types, given that the maximum distance from the
group's location is independent of W/B. The height of the trian-
gles, given by a, = -ul\P ,, is lower for the minority type,
a,
FIGURE VIII
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following Corollary 2. Tbe "mass" of participants from tbe
two t3T)6S, B and W, is obtained multiplying tbe areas of the two
triangles by a tbird dimension, B and W, respectively. In grapbical
terms, an increase in beterogeneity translates into two changes.
On tbe one band, the height of tbe B triangle (ag} increases, and
that of the W triangle (aw) decreases. On the other band, tbe
deptb B by wbicb we multiply tbe smaller triangle increases (and
W decreases by tbe same amount). Notice tbat from (A.7) we bave
('>'^aj/()P'^ I > 0, wbicb implies tbat Aa^ < — Aa^ (wbere A denotes
the absolute cbange). If tbe cbanges in oy were applied to tbe same
"deptb," by tbemselves tbey would reduce aggregate participa-
tion; tbe fact that B <W reinforces this decrease.
Turning to tbe case of multiple groups, in subsection II.4 we
prove tbat in the case of disjoint mixed groups tbe results of tbe
single-group model carry over witbout alterations. Hence, in tbis
example we focus on multiple adjacent groups. Wben tbe geo-
grapbic coverage of eacb group is 1/n < 2\u\, tbe fraction of
members type j ^ B, W belonging to any group is UiP-j,u) ^
[—(il/n) - {y4n'^)](P-j)~^''^. Tbe aggregate rate of participation is
now
u 1 \ 1 - w
(A.8) S -
n 4n^ ,. I - ^- s f-
wbicb coincides witb (A. 6) except for tbe multiplicative factor in
front of the square brackets. Tbe sign of dS/dw, i.e., tbe impact of
heterogeneity on participation, will therefore be tbe same as in
tbe one-group model.''^
H. Proof of Proposition 3
In any equilibrium witb disjoint bomogeneous groups, all and
only tbe individuals type 7 located witbin v Hw) from tbe bead-
quarters will join a group witb Pf - l,Va G [0,1]. The aggregate
participation rate is tberefore
(A.9) S = 2vw BB>
wbere A^, is tbe number of groups witb P*= 1,^' = B,W, and tbe
56. This is not surprising, given that the linearity of utility in distance implies
that when we "cut the aides" of a group we leave out the same proportion of B and
W types. However, our re.sults hinge on the separability of the utility function in
P-j and /, not on tbe specific way / enters utility. In fact, it is easy to verify that
introducing a quadratic distance term or a square root does not alter the
conclusion on the sign ofdSldw.PARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 897
indicator variable /^ takes the following values:
/fi = 1 if2v-Hu)B > [l/(n + 1)](B + W)
= 0 otherwise.
Notice that in (A.9) we are making the working assumption that
the majority type W always meets the minimum size requirement
when all the a's participate. Remembering that w = W/(B + W),
the change in S when we decrease w hy ^ > 0 around the point
where /g goes from 0 to 1 is given by
AS - NB(1 -W)- eiNw - NB).
For e —• 0, the second addendum (which captures the poten-
tial decrease in participation if the number of all-W groups
exceeds that of all-B groups), is second order compared with
the first one—hence AS > 0. The rest of Proposition 3 is
straightforward. D
APPENDIX 2: VARIABLE DEFINITION
The following is a list of the variables we use and their
sources, followed by summary statistics. The data sources are
abbreviated as follows: GSS stands for General Social Survey,
cumulative file 1972-1994; CensusCD90 refers to the CDrom
CensusCD-l-Maps by GeoLytics, Inc. (1996-1998) which contains
data from the Summary Tape Files 3F ofthe 1990 Census. In all
cases for variables constructed from the GSS, "no answer" and
"not applicable" were coded as missing values. Unless otherwise
stated, the source of a variable is authors' calculation on GSS
data.
Member: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is a member of at
least one group.
Member (excluding nationality): dummy equal to 1 if respon-
dent is a member of at least one group other than a nationality
group.
Member (excluding unions): dummy equal to 1 if respondent
is a member of at least one group other than a union.
Cohort: year of birth ofthe respondent.
Age < 30: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is less than 30
years old.
Age 30-39: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is between 30 and
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Age 50-59; dummy equal to 1 if respondent is between 50 and
59 years old.
Age > 60: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is 60 years old or
more.
Married: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is married.
Female: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is female.
Black; dummy equal to 1 if respondent is African-American.
Educ < 12 yrs: dummy equal to 1 if respondent bas less tban
twelve years of education.
Educ > 16 yrs: dummy equal to 1 if respondent bas more tban
sixteen years of education.
Cbildren < 5 yrs: dummy equal to 1 if respondent bas
cbildren age five or less.
Children 6-12: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has children
age six to twelve.
Children 13-17: dummy equal to 1 if respondent bas children
age thirteen to seventeen.
In (real income): logarithm of respondent's family income
(constant 1986 US$).
Full-time: dummy equal to 1 if respondent works full-time.
Part-time: dummy equal to 1 if respondent works part-time.
Size of place: logaritbm of tbe size of place wbere respondent
lives (tbousands of people).
Med HH income: logaritbm of median bousehold income in
MSA/PMSA where respondent lives [Source: authors' calculation
onCensusCD90].
Med HH income^: square of the logarithm of median house-
hold income in MSA/PMSA where respondent lives [Source:
authors' calculation on CensusCD90].
Gini: Gini coefficient on family income in MSA/PMSA wbere
respondent lives. Actual Gini coefficients were computed for the
years 1970, 1980, 1990. The values for tbe remaining years in tbe
sample were obtained by linear interpolation (and extrapolation
for 1991-1994) [Source: autbors' calculation on IPUMS 1%,
Census 1970, 1980,1990].
Race: racial fragmentation index in MSA/PMSA wbere respon-
dent lives, defined in expression (16) in tbe text. Tbe five
categories used for tbe sbares are tbe original Census categories:
i) wbite; ii) black; iii) American Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian; iv)
Asian, Pacific Islander; v) otber [Source: autbors' calculation on
CensusCD90].
Ethnic: etbnic fragmentation index in MSA/PMSA wberePARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 899
respondent lives, defined in expression (16) in the text. The ten
categories used for the shares are obtained aggregating the
original "first ancestries" from the Census as follows: (1) Arah; (2)
Sub-Saharan African; (3) West Indian; (4) Race or Hispanic
origin; (5) Canadian, United States, or American; (6) Austrian,
Belgian, Dutch, English, French Canadian, German, Irish, Scotch-
Irish, Scottish, Swiss, Welsh; (7) Czech, Hungarian, Lithuanian,
Polish, Romanian, Russian, Slovak, Ukrainian, Yugoslavian; (8)
French, Greek, Italian, Portuguese; (9) Danish, Finnish, Norwe-
gian, Swedish; (10) other. Each share is computed as a share of
people in that category over the total population in the MSA/
PMSA (excluding people with "ancestry unclassified" and "ances-
try not reported") [Source: authors'calculation on CensusCD90].
NGOV62: number of municipal and township governments in
the MSA/PMSA in 1962 (Source: Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor
[1999]).
MANSHR: share ofthe lahor force employed in manufactur-
ing in the MSA/PMSA in 1990 (Source: Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor
[1999]).
NOBLKDINNER: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has not
had a black person home for dinner in past few years. Original
GSS survey question: "During the last few years, has anyone in
your family brought a friend who was a black home for dinner?"
Prompted answers coded in the GSS variable RACHOME: 1 =
Yes; 2 = No; 8 = Don't know; 9 = No answer. Our variable takes
value 1 if RACHOME = 2 and zero otherwise.
NORACCHNG: dummy equal to 1 if respondent says that
he/she would not try to change racist rules in a club. Original GSS
survey question: "If you and your friends belonged to a social club
that would not let whites/blacks join, would you try to change the
rules so that they could join?" Prompted answers coded in the GSS
variable RACGHNG: 1 = Yes; 2 = No; 3 = Wouldn't belong to club;
8 = Don't know; 9 = No answer. Our variable takes value 1 if
RACCHNG = 2 and zero otherwise.
RACSEGR; dummy equal to 1 if respondent strongly agrees
that whites have a right to segregated neighborhoods. Original
GSS survey question: "White people have a right to keep blacks
out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and blacks should
respect that right." Prompted answers coded in the GSS variable
RACSEG: 1 ^ Agree strongly; 2 = Agree slightly; 3 ^ Disagree
slightly; 4 = Disagree strongly; 8 ^ No opinion; 9 ^ No answer.
Our variable takes value 1 if RAGSEG = 1 and zero otherwise.900 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
NOMOSTSCHOOL: dummy equal to 1 if respondent would
not send cbildren to school with most cbildren of tbe opposite race.
Original GSS survey question: "Would you yourself bave any
objection to sending your cbildren to a scbool wbere most of tbe
cbildren are Wbites/Blacks?" Prompted answers coded in the GSS
variable RACMOST: 1 = Yes; 2 = No; 3 = Don't know. Our
variable takes value 1 if RACMOST = 1 and zero otherwise.
RACTEACH: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks tbat
racists should be allowed to teach. Original GSS survey question;
"Consider a person who believes that blacks are genetically
inferior. Sbould sucb a person be allowed to teacb in a college or
university, or not?" Prompted answers coded in tbe GSS variable
COLRAC: 4 = Yes, allowed; 5 = Not allowed; 8 = Don't know; 9 =
No answer. Our variable takes value 1 if COLRAC = 4 and zero
otherwise.
NOBLKPRESID: dummy equal to 1 if respondent would not
vote for black president. Original GSS survey question: "If your
party nominated a black for President, would you vote for bim if
be were qualified for tbe job?" Prompted answers coded in the GSS
variable 'RACPRES'; 1 = Yes; 2 - No; 8 = Don't know; 9 = No
answer. Our variable takes value 1 if RACPRES = 2 and zero
otherwise.
NOMIXMARRIAGE: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is
against mixed marriages. Original GSS survey question; "Do you
think tbere should be laws against marriages between blacks and
wbites?" Prompted answers coded in tbe GSS variable 'RACMAR':
1 = Yes; 2 = No; 3 = Don't know. Our variable takes value 1 if
RACMAR = 1 and zero otberwise.
NOBUSING; dummy equal to 1 if respondent opposes busing.
Original GSS survey question: "In general, do you favor or oppose
tbe busing of hlack and wbite scbool cbildren from one scbool
district to another?" Prompted answers coded in the GSS variable
'BUSING': 1 = Eavor; 2 = Oppose; 8 - Don't know; 9 - No answer.
Our variable takes value 1 if BUSING - 2 and zero otberwise.
BLKNOPUSH: dummy equal to 1 if respondent tbinks
that blacks sbould not push. Original GSS survey question: "Here
are some opinions otber people bave expressed in connection with
black-white relations. Wbicb statement on tbe card comes closest
to how you, yourself, feel? The first one is: Blacks shouldn't
pusb themselves wbere tbey're not wanted." Prompted answersPARTICIPATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES 901
coded in the GSS variable 'RACPUSH': 1 - Agree strongly; 2 =
Agree slightly; 3 = Disagree slightly; 4 = Disagree strongly; 8 =
No opinion; 9 = No answer. Our variable takes value 1 if
RACPUSH = 1 and zero otherwise.
APPENDIX 3: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Mean Std. dev. No. obs.
Member .72 .45
Member (excl. nationality) .71 .45
Member (excl. unions)
Cohort 1939.85 17.59
Age <30 .25 .43
Age 30-39 .24 .43
Age 50-59 .13 .34
Age >60 .20 .40
Married .56 .50
Female .56 .50
Black .16 .37
Educ < 12 yrs .24 .43
Educ>16yrs .22 .41
Children ^^5 yrs .19 .39
Children 6-12 ,22 .41
Children 13-17 .18 .38
In (real income) 10.03 .93
Full-time .52 .50
Part-time . 10 .30
Size of place 4.28 2.18
Med HH income 10.38 .14
Med HH inc A2 107.74 3.0
Gini .41 .03
Race .36 .14
Ethnic .67 .07
NGOV62 89.84 90.78
MANSHR .17 .05
NOMIXMARRIAGE .19 .40
NOBLKDINNER .68 .47
BLKNOPUSH .32 .47
NOHALFSCHOOL . 19 .39
RACTEACH .44 .50
NOBLKPRESID .12 .33
NOBUSING .73 .44
10031
9922
9922
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
10031
5901
4493
2885
5717
4661
5872
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APPENDIX 4: NONLINEARITIES IN INCOME
In (real income)
In Ireal income) A2
In Ireal income) A3
Below poverty
Gini
Race
Ethnic
INDIV
CONTROLS''
STATES
YEARS
No. obs.
Pseudo R^
Observed P
Predicted P
(1)
-1,789**
(,550)
.196**
(.060)
-,007**
(.002)
-.901**
(,242)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10534
.10
.72
.74
(2)
-1.818**
(.582)
,204**
(,063)
-.007**
(.002)
.039*
(.020)
-1.029**
(,244)
Ye.s
Yes
Yes
10181
.09
.72
.74
(3)
-1,806**
(,553)
,198**
(,060)
-.007**
(.002)
_ 201^^*
(.058)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10534
,10
.72
.74
(4)
-1,835**
(,586)
,205**
(.064)
-.007**
(.002)
.039*
f.O2O)
-.227**
(.056)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10181
,09
.72
,74
(5)
-1.821**
(.546)
.199**
(.059)
-.007**
(.002)
- ,256**
(.106)
Yes
Yes
Yes
10534
.09
.72
.74
(6)
-1.853**
(.577)
,207**
(,063)
-,007**
(.002)
.039*
(.020)
-.282**
(.108)
Yea
Yes
Yes
10181
,09
.72
,74
*Denolea siRnificance at the 10 percent level; *"at the 5 percent level,
MarRinal probit coefficients are calculated at the means. Standard errors are. corrected for hptero.-ikedas-
ticity and clustering of the residuals at the MSA level,
a. Individual controls: all those listed in Tahle II,
APPENDIX 5: FIRST-STAGE REGRESSIONS (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GINI)
Column of reference in Table VI
12) 131 151
NGOV62
REV1G62
MANSHR
CONTROLS"
STATES
YEARS
No. obs.
0001**
0000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
725
67
,0001^
(,0000)
.117*
(.063)
Yes
Yes
Yes
725
.67
.0001**
(.0000)
-.092
(.080)
Yes
Yes
Yes
725
.67
'Denotes significance at the 10 percent level; **at the 5 percent level.
Marginal probit coefficients are calculated at the means. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedas-
ticity and dusteringof the residuals at the MSA level,
a. Controls: means at the MSA/PMSA !PVP! nf all individual controls listed in Table II, plus size. Hincmd,
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